Introduction
In Stevie Smith's lines the subject is mistakenly assumed to be happily waving from offshore but he is in fact unhappily drowning; the image that the viewer has is one of frenetic energy, a celebration of progress and skill in a difficult technique. But the image that the subject is trying to give, while certainly energetic, is frantic rather than frenetic, a funeral wake not a funny wave. The technique looks the same but the consequence is starkly different. This paper suggests that the progress made towards the acquisition of quality through TQM, ISO 9000, BPR, BSCs (balanced score cards) and all the other related TLAs (three letter acronyms) and techniques is in danger of consuming itself through a process in which the goal is displaced by the means: quality by measurement. This form of development, defeat snatched from the jaws of victory, failure constructed from precisely those features that generated success in the first place, has a long and distinguished career whose theoretical origins we can trace at least as far back as Hegel.
I have no doubt that great progress has been made towards quality improvement through TQM and ISO 9000; however, I am struck by the warning embodied in Stevie Smith's lines. What follows is divided into two sections. The first focuses on the waves, not waves of appreciation -much of this activity has already gone on and will continue afterwards -but on waves of managerial fashion (Grint, 1997) . Here I consider various arguments for the growth of the quality movement, some of which carry their own warnings on the likely future. In the second part I focus on the drownings. Here I want to explain where some of the dangers to the quality movement lurk.
Waves of change by numbers
I am sure most readers are familiar with Pascale's (1990, p. 20) reconstruction of managerial changes since World War II. In this diagram he lists all the major developments that have swept over management like waves crashing on to a beach. If we assume that there are probably a few missing from this list (intuition, leadership, balanced score cards, etc.) then we get to an interesting figure: every year, on average, a new fashion emerges. Where do all these fashions come from? Do they all work? Do any of them work? Do we know enough about any of them to say that, without hesitation, they are sound? I think there are at least five major different approaches to explaining this plethora of permutations, this feast of fashions, this cornucopia of change: two of these are rational accounts, two emotional accounts and one is itself a mirror of fashion.
Wave number 1: the rational idea approach
The first explanation is the simplest: we innovate all the time because innovation works. In other words, because in a dynamic market economy the only way to stay marginally ahead of your competitors (or customers/ clients, etc.) is to generate some kind of competitive advantage through innovation. It is, then, the internal logic of the idea itself which ensures its success. For manufacturing companies this may mean innovative products, for service organizations this may mean innovative services. So if we are looking to explain the success of TQM, for instance, we need to consider whether it actually works, and whether the investment is likely to be more than compensated for by the ultimate pay-off. Since the world out there is a jungle, the law of the jungle ensures that only the fittest survive -hence those management changes that work survive. In this wave the focus lies on the rationality of the idea.
Wave number 2: the structural requirements approach
The second explanation, the structural approach, considers the extent to which the explanation for change lies completely outside the remit or control of individuals or groups and falls squarely within the requirements of the logical requirements of the situation -which tend to be economic structures.
This approach also takes account of the incremental development of management fashions: that is, each fashion may not necessarily undermine the former but may, rather, appear as a wave that builds on its predecessor, retaining the progress made before, while discarding the weaknesses and extending the residual strengths. The metaphorical wave may also embody an alternative "tidal" concept, in which management fashions can, in part, be explained by management's need to alter its control strategies to suit the conditions. Thus management fashions can be considered as directly responding to the economy, either enhancing or reducing direct control over labour as determined by the "logic" of the situation. Naturally, if managers choose an inappropriate -that is irrational and illogical -approach to the problem of control they will fail.
Management theory, especially American management theory, has generally been construed to represent this rational development towards a more effective system over time. One of the most popular models tends to divide management styles into three modes, shifting from coercive to economically and rationally utilitarian to normative, in line with work changes (e.g. Edwards, 1979) . A rather different approach taken by Barley and Kunda (1992) replaces the evolutionary pattern with a bipolar or pendulum pattern as control shifts from normative to rational and back again across time. Thus they consider the USA to have experienced five distinct patterns: industrial betterment (normative) from 1870 to 1900; scientific management (rational), from 1900 to 1923; human relations (normative), from 1923 to 1955; systems approaches (rational), from 1955 to 1980; and, finally, organized culture (normative), from 1980 to the(ir) present (1992) . Very crudely reduced, we could say that the normative approach was rooted in securing the commitment of the employees while the rational approach was rooted in securing control over employees. Barley and Kunda (1992, p. 387) suggest it is possible that moral or normative methods are employed during times of crisis and rational methods during times of relative calm but since this does not match the patterns of labour unrest it seems unlikely to explain the changes. Their own preference is for an explanation that links the normative-rational cycle through an alternating emphasis on the significance of managing labour (normative control) and capital (rational control), and this is locked into the long waves of economic and technological development first developed by Schumpeter (1976) and Kondratieff (1935) . Long waves, which last approximately 50 years, involve a period of rapid economic expansion spurred on by accumulated capital investment and particular technological developments, followed by a period of consolidation and contraction as declining returns set in. Thus we have a first wave that coincides with the beginnings of the industrial revolution and lasts until the mid-nineteenth century; a second wave until the last decade of the nineteenth century that coincides with steam machinery, railroads and the like; a third wave from the 1890s until World War II, dominated by electricity and the internal combustion engine; and a fourth wave until the present period where electronics, air transport and synthetic materials predominate. Barley and Kunda (1992, p. 391) , suggest that these long waves are mirrored by the managerial ideology swings, as the expansion phase of each long wave is accompanied by a rational approach and the contraction phase is linked to a normative emphasis. What we should see in the future, then, is not just an increased adoption of rational ideologies within management but the advance of novel technologies that facilitate the beginnings of the fifth long wave.
What are the implications of this account of change for our consultants or managers? At first it might seem that they (and we) are in the hands of structural forces that we may be able to understand but can do little about. Yet the central message is actually not as deterministic as it sounds. It may be that what is required is for managers to understand the structural forces that impinge on them and alter their methods and ideologies so that they are symmetrical with, and aligned to, the current state of affairs. For example, if we assume that the model is accurate then we should soon start to see an increase in capital investment, technological advancement and economic growth, along with a gradual switch from normative to rational ideologies. As I mentioned above, we may consider the rise in psychometric testing, balanced score cards, and the urge to measure whatever can be measured, as the beginnings of a new rational wave. Hence those managers who adopt these approaches first, or who employ consultants offering such services first, are the ones most likely to secure an early competitive advantage. Conversely, those who continue to use old normative means -and old technologies -may well find themselves redundant in the not too distant future. In effect, management fashions change for dif- ferent reasons: in the long term (cyclical periods of around 50 years), change occurs because of a combination of economic, technological and ideological reasons; in the short term (cyclical periods of less than five years) it may be that each variation in managerial ideology merely extends the underlying leitmotiv. Put another way, it implies that short-term change is likely to have merely a marginal effect on performance and more likely that the leaps of performance are associated with the point at which the gradual downturn in economic activity changes to begin the new upturn. Coincidentally, this means that we are now on the verge of a great leap forward -now where have I heard that before?
Wave number 3: the charismatic approach A third explanation for the rise of management fashions focuses rather more on the weaknesses of organizational leaders than the requirements of the environment. In this approach, leaders are inadequate to the task (for whatever reason) of steering their organizations through troubled times. It may be that the background to this explanation is identical to the previous one: an unstable and increasingly competitive market where the level of information is either too large to handle or too small to make any difference. In the face of increased uncertainty, and where (literally) last year's organizational model proves increasingly inefficient, leaders are forced to look beyond themselves for salvation. Nor is it appropriate simply to examine the logic of any alternative strategy because the leaders simply do not have the ability to analyse this -they are left to respond not logically but emotionally and they tend to consider how an idea or individual may save them rather than examining what the external situation suggests they should do. The charismatic consultant does not have quite as long a historical record as the court jester but there are clear similarities. One only has to witness the Tom Peters in action to see this. The content of the performance appears to be secondary to the performance itself but the content is itself part of the performance. That is to say that Peters, and other management gurus like him, generate a high level of destabilization among the audience which effectively "unfreezes"' them, then the promise of salvation is offered if the participants agree to "change", and finally the novelty of the new way is related back to the old ways so that participants may "refreeze" the learning and the changes.
The other aspect of this which is worth highlighting relates to the location of the driver for change. If consultants are dependent for their influence on their performance then we have to be clearer on the identity of those affected. For the most part it is not going to be those middle managers who are responsible for implementing change that are going to be affected by consultants' performances because they seldom see them. Instead, it is likely to be either the CEO or senior manager who attends and is persuaded, or it is colleagues and peers of the CEO and senior managers who attend the performance and remark on its significance to their colleagues at a later date -perhaps on the golf course, or at their club and so on. If we retain this knowledge then it explains what often appears to be a perennial conundrum: why do organizations involve themselves in so much change when most of those involved in the change often hold a rather jaundiced view about the utility of change? Since the driver for change and the enactor of change may well be different the conundrum is, at least partially, resolved.
Finally, one should note the significance of being regarded as a fashion-setter rather than fashion taker. If part of the attraction of the consultant as charismatic is that some of the charisma may rub off on those who are first to use the latest technique then we might explain the desire of CEOs to throw themselves on to the experimental altar. Moreover, there is something exciting about being in at the sharp end, despite or perhaps because of, the inherent dangers there.
Wave number 4: the distancing approach
In 1899 Thorstein Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class considered the way material progress facilitated a feature of social life that appeared anything but progressive: that is, the continuous retrenchment of status divisions. Veblen suggested that the increasing abundance of material goods in the USA generated the possibility of using the "conspicuous consumption" of luxury goods as a means of distancing oneself from those with subordinate status. A similar process appears to occur without conspicuous consumption but with conspicuous relabelling: thus the historical distinction in Britain between middle class meal times ("dinner" in the evening) versus working class meal times ("dinner" at midday and "tea" in the evening) have altered through time to the point where the working "…the charismatic consultant does not have quite as long a historical record as the court jester, but there are clear similarities...the content of the performance appears to be secondary to the performance itself…"
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class have "dinner" in the evening but the middle class now have "supper". The point, therefore, need not be what form the socialdistancing or the reproduction of social hierarchy takes but that it happens at all, and that it is an emotional rather than a rational response to change.
In terms of clothing fashions this distancing phenomenon is tightly associated with identity construction: it is because your parents wear certain kinds of clothes that you do not and vice versa. Furthermore, groups may consciously avoid mimicking their alleged social superiors (Simmel, 1971) . For example, the lounge suit is still the uniform of most managers while shopfloor workers wear overalls and office staff wear something in between. The significance of this can be established by the role uniforms play in some of the change programmes themselves. For instance, many vehicle or vehicle part manufacturers in Britain have adopted "workwear" which consciously decreases the social distance between managers and employees through the collective provision of a standard uniform for all members of the company irrespective of their status (Rover is probably the most obvious example).
What change programmes may do is provide the worn-out manager with a new identity which is distanced from a previous one. Here the distance secured is from something the manager once was, not someone the manager seeks to retain a degree of superiority over. We might turn to consultants because they offer us the prospect of something rather more exciting than that we were used to.
For senior managers, therefore, we might suggest that change programmes offer the possibility of maintaining -or re-establishing -or even reducing -some distance between themselves and middle managers through an array of change programmes. Alternatively, it may be that interorganizational not intraorganizational rivalry is the causal element, as rival organizations vie for the position of "leading edge" with each other. It is not, then, which change programme that is important but that the idea of an innovative and powerful group of leaders exist who have the ability to change direction as and when they please. If this hypothesis is accurate we would expect to see change programmes increase in velocity as status divisions between senior and middle managers decrease. In other words, if the emotive issue of status maintenance is significant then no amount of logical social engineering will obliterate the differentiations and, on the contrary, novel ways of maintaining the social distance between status groups will emerge as fast as change programmes seek to undermine them.
Similarly, the concept of change as fashion should also alert us to the point that different fashions mediate between the potentially overwhelming choices that are available (clothes, cars, ideologies, religions and so forth). Fashions are not anarchic and there do appear to be consistently demarcated patterns: the goth, the punk, the skinhead, the executive, the student and so on. We are faced, then, not with 1 million choices of what to be but with a much smaller number that embody obligatory -but not mandatoryaccoutrements. For example, academics tend to be liberally minded and wear casual clothes. Fashion thus generates a series of normative boundaries that ease the difficulty of choice. For management fashions the same principle applies. Faced with an enormous amount of information and choice about what to do, managers' decisions are made significantly easier by adopting whatever the class leaders are adopting. These choices are not logical but emotional and they are externally, not internally, oriented: we choose fashions because they appeal to our vanity and these fashions are not constructed by us as individuals but by collectives of others. Overall it seems that the majority of change programmes of all variants fail. Both a cause and a consequence of this is the search for yet another change programme that will deliver the goods virtually overnight without organizations -or at least the senior managershaving to go through too much soul searching or organizational sweat (Pascale, 1990) . Once a sufficient number of middle managers and development managers have taken the new programme on board those at the top can forget about the problem -at least for a little while. The consequence of this is that change programmes change. In short, that change for the sake of change resembles the adoption of fashionable clothing -that, for example, BPR or TQM or MBO are accepted and regurgitated not because they may be evaluated as objectively "good" ideas but because they are fashionable ideas. As a result, managers only accept the changes in the same light that they accept changes in fashion -one does not buy a suit to last forever but until fashion dictates that we should not be seen wearing it in public, and our dedication to it, therefore, is consequently temporary. We can surmise that a major reason for the persistence of change programmes, from this perspective, has less to do with the performance of the consultant or the logical promise of radical business improvements and more to do with the emotional significance of internal status and identity construction in the face of increasing complexity.
Wave number 5: the institutional approach
The possibility that change programmes are enacted because of a guru performance or a meeting of minds on the golf course may appear a little whimsical when we are discussing the significance of the issue at hand. However, institutional theory (Scott and Meyer, 1994) suggests that organizational decision makers, especially under conditions of uncertainty, are forced into taking action that resembles the lead taken by others in the field. For instance, if a leading car producer adopted self-organized teams, rather than a conventional assembly line, to build vehicles, then its competitors may well assume that teams are more efficient than assembly lines. If they were not then why would a respected company like this adopt such a production system? Under this approach the normative influences on individuals are too great for most to resist -not only does it seem rational to copy a field leader but the possibility that the mimicry is undertaken for normative reasons rather than rational reasons is itself denied. The result is that we would not be seen dead wearing flared trousers, not because they are old fashioned but (we persuade ourselves) because they are such an irrational garment to wear. The power of normative influence is often difficult to establish for that very reason -they are normative. One might, for example, consider the conventional Western reaction to the wearing of the chador by women in some Islamic societies. This may appear to be a considerable infringement of their personal rights and a wholly irrational element of culture. Yet we in the West simultaneously generate our own normative controls that in and of themselves appear rational rather then normative. For instance, we do not expect to see adults completely naked while wandering around in public. Yet such behaviour is perfectly acceptable under certain circumstances. Normative influences, then, are primarily significant at a level that evades conscious analysis; they are, as they say, perfectly normal.
Given this, it would appear remarkable if managers were not subject to the same kind of normative pressures at work. Do we expect leaders to have visions? If not can they be regarded as legitimate leaders? Assuming the answer to this latter question is no then we might also expect organizations to follow one another into the whirlwind of changebecause everyone else is doing it and therefore so should we. Naturally, some of the changes will not work properly but the underlying philosophy of the West, at least since the Enlightenment, has been that progress is natural and therefore that change is usually for the better. Furthermore, since progress implies change then stasis implies a lack of progress. In short, once a change programme has been up and running for a year or two then its potency as a manifestation of progress is "progressively" eroded to the point when the very term becomes a cliché for old fashioned.
This inherent tendency to decay naturally plays straight into the hands of those who have an interest in generating change: consultants and trend setters. For these groups change is rather like a game of problem construction in which the winner is the person who develops more solutions than anyone else. Now the real point of the game is not to produce solutions to problems that already exist but to generate problems through the creation of solutions. For example, our inability to measure certain things -like customer satisfaction within a service environment -is not a problem until a method is devised to measure it. At this point customer satisfaction that is not measured appears to be a problem that has always been with us -and the measuring method is marketed as a solution to it. (See Grint (1995) for an example of this applied to computer problems.)
What are the consequences of this final approach for practising managers? Given the power of normative forces it may be difficult to establish what a manager should do -but rather easier to predict what he or she will do. In other words, if fashion (un)consciousness is so influential then perhaps managers should not be embarking on change programmes all the time -because there is little evidence that they work as well as is claimed -and being fashionable is not necessarily a good reason to turn the organizational world upside down. On the other hand, if this is what is expected of organizations then those which resist will be labelled as "old fashioned", as no longer at the "cutting edge" and as unworthy of support. So the dilemma remains a powerful one.
Drownings by numbers
If there are a number of different ways of explaining the waves of change that crash over and into management is there an equally diverse way of considering the potential forms of drowning available to those in the midst of change? As I mentioned, I am concerned here not with issues that can go wrong with the application of change, such as not ensuring the requirements of TQM or ISO 9000 are complied with, but with asking whether the very compliance itself poses a threat to the goal itself.
Drowning number 1: Rousseau: "forced to be free"
One of the critical touchstones of TQM is the involvement and commitment of the workforce at all levels. Since quality control must be delegated to its lowest possible position this means ensuring that shopfloor workers or office workers are responsible for their own quality control. In turn, this requires everyone to be fully committed to TQM because quality can only be assured through trust. Managers cannot closely oversee their employees without simultaneously undermining the necessary trust and self-direction which TQM requires. But commitment is best achieved through ownership, it is an autonomous not a heteronomous issue and cannot be secured through imposition from above. Here lies the first drowning in all its Rousseauean clothes. For Rousseau the perfect society could only be achieved if people voluntarily acceded to the laws which they themselves freely construct -and if they unwittingly or irrationally refuse then they "must be forced to be free". In terms of TQM this means that it is fundamentally premissed on all employees owning -and being committed to -the notion of selfresponsibility for quality. But the requirements of ISO 9000 and TQM do not require the employees to construct the metrics for monitoring; on the contrary the metrics are developed by "experts" from above them or outside the organization. Those responsible for quality then, do not own the system and have, at best, a fragile commitment to it -hence they must be forced to be free -they must be required to conform for the system to work. This does not merely limit individual employees but whole companies, which are required to register for ISO 9000 or the equivalent by those firms to which they subcontract. In short, if commitment is best secured through ownership, then a system of externally imposed standards, however necessary, cannot be the vehicle for securing this commitment. Subordinates may comply with requirements but this does not mean they are committed to them and if commitment is a necessary feature then this is a drowning signal not a waving signal.
Drowning number 2: Heisenberg -the uncertainty principle
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle suggests that there are various pairs of properties that cannot be measured accurately at the same time, notably the position and velocity of a sub-atomic particle; if we can measure the velocity of the particle we cannot know its position -which is essentially indeterminate. Indeed, the very process of measuring one affects the other to make the dual measurement not merely more difficult but theoretically impossible. This is similar to one of the most obvious yet least appreciated aspects of motivational schemes that occasionally, just occasionally, they work. If we pay people to concentrate on quality the quantity tends to drop, and if we pay them by quantity then quality seems to drop. The problem is that both are important but they appear to be mutually exclusive -the more we concentrate on one the more the other seems to move, and vice versa.
The implication of this for us here is that our attempt to measure the world may be having unintended consequences. In principle everything can be measured -we can allocate nominal or subjective values to whatever we want -so the problem is not that some things cannot be measured. Rather, it is the effort involved in measuring some things that persuades us to measure something easier. For example, British schooling still concentrates on the "3 Rs": Reading, Riting and Rithmetic (still a problem here I hear you say). But why are these three the most important -because they are the foundations of everything else? Perhaps, but how does this cover areas like ethics or team skills or leadership competences, etc.? One account of the origin of this concentration on the 3 Rs suggests that when school became compulsory in England and Wales -and the government needed a way to keep the costs down and to maintain control over teachers -the 3 Rs were the simplest method of doing both simultaneously: they were easily measurable and the results could be used to pay teachers performance related pay. The long-term consequences of this concern to monitor teaching quality were to generate a wholly individualist approach to education: for example, since it is difficult to assess the input of individuals to teamwork there is very little teamwork taught in schools and universities, except, of course, on the sports field. Thus we educate in a very individually-oriented manner -despite the fact that a very large degree of our adult work involves team working. At work the consequence is that we measure those elements that are easily measured but not those that are difficult: we measure quality standards of the manufactured product or customer satisfaction levels but tend to avoid measuring leadership skills or team working ability. Yet it may be that the more intangible issues hold the key to future success: quality measurements can tell us whether we are reaching the required standards of today, but not whether this also makes staying in business tomorrow harder.
Drowning number 3: Sartre's pyramid investment
Much of the literature on quality improvements and, indeed, on most managerial changes, suggests that improvements are relatively free; sure there is some pain to negotiate but the benefits afterwards are obvious to all. A recent equivalent seems to have been the Albanian people's flirtation with pyramid investment schemes promising 80 per cent returns on investment. The consequence, inevitably, has been catastrophic.
A major consequence of most contemporary organizational "improvements" is a radical thinning out of labour, through delayering or downsizing or whatever. Somewhere in the middle of all this somebody loses because the pyramid has no base. And just as Sartre's axiom suggests that the only certain thing about life is death, so the only certain thing about business improvements seems to be that success for some breeds failure for others. As a consequence of TQM and many other related developments, many supervisors, middle managers and quality department members now have a long and illustrious future behind them -in short not everyone is waving and quite a few are drowning. This may, of course, be inevitable -but it also explains why not everyone is enthralled by the prospect of quality. Moreover, there is a strong suspicion that the real driver behind many moves towards quality is actually costreduction not quality enhancement. Whatever the real driver is the basic point remains the same: change programmes often come unstuck because they are essentially political and not rational movements: they are not designed to ensure that everyone wins but that some win and some lose -and the consequence is inevitably a degree of resistance.
Drowning number 4: Weber's bureaucratic nautilus
I began by considering how one German thinker, Hegel, provides an idea from which a raft of explanations for the problems of developing quality can be derived. I will finish with another, Weber, a German sociologist who wrote in the early part of this century. Weber's relevance here relates to his ideas about bureaucracy, or rational legal administration. For Weber the administration of organizations by experts would inevitably displace other forms of control (such as traditional and charismatic forms of authority) because it was far more efficient (see Grint, 1991, pp. 108-12) . If you applied the practices and procedures of science to organizational life it would necessarily work better than an equivalent organization controlled by an absolute monarch or a charismatic leader. Thus, if you apply the formal methods of auditing and quality control as embodied in TQM and ISO 9000 you will inevitably generate a more efficient organization with a higher level of quality than that run without these same procedures. However, Weber was renowned as an arch-pessimist: in his eyes the future would become increasingly bureaucratized and efficient -but the point of the efficiency would be lost in the maze of bureaucracy itself, in the myriads of procedures, experts and measures and systems designed to ensure maximum efficiency. For Weber the purpose of an organization could only be derived from a political or evaluative standpoint -there simply was no way that science could help us establish what the goodlife actually was, but once we had made a political decision about what it was science could then help us get there. The problem was that the methods gradually suffocated the goal, the means became the end, the procedures became the purpose. In one form TQM implies a debureaucratization of the workplace as responsibility is decentralized to the person directly involved in production. But this is overlain by an array of procedures and metrics that, by definition, redeploy a layer of bureaucracy. Furthermore, there comes a point at which adherence to the requirements of the system become more important than the purpose of the system in the first place. In other words, from a position where TQM and ISO 9000 were systems to achieve greater business success it is plausible to consider the extent to which they can take on a life of their own -to become the purpose itself, rather than be a means to a purpose. In Weber's nightmare future organizations are extremely efficient at auditing themselves but why they do this is a mystery because their very purpose has become obscure. Just as a nautilus is a very efficient mollusc, but has no way of controlling where it is going, so too our quality organizations are in danger of producing what they produce with very high levels of quality -but without much concern for why they are producing what they produce: high quality Sinclair C5 vehicles or high quality Concordes might be regarded as examples of products where the quality system drove the purpose of the product, or in Pascale's terms, where organizational "doing" displaced organizational "being". Beware the nautilitic organization.
Conclusion
I have talked at length about the problems of TQM, etc., but not very much about its benefits and achievements. This is because those very successes enwrap the seeds of failure. The drownings that I have outlined are not coincidental failures nor are they failures derived from problematic implementations. Rather they are the problems of success: if I did not think TQM was viable and valuable these would not be worth reiterating but they remain nonetheless. The challenge is to ensure that success breeds further success and not the failure that Hegel and Weber predict are the inevitable consequence of our attempt to improve the world. There is a fine line between confidence and arrogance and it is difficult to be guilty of the latter if one is not blessed with the former. If you want to maintain business excellence you might constrain excellence in busy-ness.
